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Abstract—When working with joint collections of confidential
data from multiple sources, e.g., in cloud-based multi-party
computation scenarios, the ownership relation between data
providers and their inputs itself is confidential information.
Protecting data providers’ privacy desires a function for secretly
shuffling the data collection. We present the first efficient secure
multi-party computation protocol for secret shuffling in scenarios
with a central server. Based on a novel approach to random
index distribution, our solution enables the randomization of the
order of a sequence of encrypted data such that no observer
can map between elements of the original sequence and the
shuffled sequence with probability better than guessing. It allows
for shuffling data encrypted under an additively homomorphic
cryptosystem with constant round complexity and linear com-
putational complexity. Being a general-purpose protocol, it is of
relevance for a variety of practical use cases.
Index Terms—Privacy-preserving computation, secure multi-
party computation, homomorphic encryption, secret shuffling
I. INTRODUCTION
In an industrial context, security against semi-honest ad-
versaries [26] is a valid assumption as companies typically
have a financial and legal interest in the correct execution of
processes. Proactive misbehaviour or negligent data handling
could lead to a loss of reputation or legal consequences,
such as those imposed by the European Union’s General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) [30].
To make well-informed business decisions, companies need
to determine their strengths and weaknesses. One widely-used
measure is cross-company benchmarking. In cross-company
benchmarking, companies compare their key performance
indicators (KPI), e.g., return on investment, to those of other
companies of the same industry. As results, they obtain sta-
tistical measures, such as quartiles and mean. To compute
rank-based statistical measures like quartiles, sorting KPIs
typically is an important aspect of benchmarking. However,
as the companies’ performances are confidential, no company
should learn another company’s KPIs. Instead, benchmark
results should only help them determine how they perform
relatively to their overall peer group. To ensure that, bench-
marks typically are performed by trusted third parties (TTP),
neutral companies that take the companies’ KPIs in plaintext
and centrally compute the statistical measures. However, using
a TTP requires trust. On the one hand, companies need to
trust that the TTP does not proactively abuse the companies’
private KPIs. As described above, this is a valid assumption
as the neutral party has a financial and legal interest in honest
behavior. However, on the other hand, they need to trust
that the TTP implements sufficient security measures that
prevent data breaches. This is an important drawback of the
TTP approach as data breaches might cost companies their
competitive advantage or reputation.
Alternatively, benchmarking could be performed via secure
multi-party computation (MPC) [15]. An MPC protocol em-
ulates a TTP by having the parties, e.g., companies, jointly
evaluate some public function, e.g., quartile computation, over
their inputs. Most importantly, those inputs are kept private,
e.g., processed in an encrypted form. Such a protocol is
secure in the sense that parties only learn their own inputs,
their outputs, and what can be inferred from that. Hence,
confidential KPIs are protected from any internal and external
observer, enabling privacy-preserving benchmarking. We re-
strict our considerations to MPC scenarios where n parties
each contribute confidential inputs and jointly evaluate the
target function with a service provider. We refer to the data
providers as players and require the service provider to be a
single, central instance (see Fig. 1).
As the core of a benchmarking MPC protocol, encrypted
KPIs need to be sorted according to their underlying plaintexts
in a privacy-preserving fashion. This can be done via sorting
networks in up to n logn comparisons orchestrated by a
service provider as described in [21]. However, this would
cause the service provider to learn the order of the confidential
KPIs, that is, how a particular company performs relatively
to another particular company. Even if the service provider
is assumed to not misuse this information proactively, a data
breach could leak this confidential performance information.
To reduce the risk of benchmarks leaking confidential data
and relative performance information, an efficient privacy-
preserving benchmarking protocol based on MPC should
ensure anonymity in the sense that no observer can infer
ownership relations between companies and their encrypted
KPIs. This can be done by secretly shuffling the encrypted
KPIs prior to benchmarking. We refer to a secret shuffle
as a function that randomizes the order of a sequence of
encrypted inputs such that no observer can map elements
Fig. 1: Network of One Service Provider and Four Players
in the original sequence to their corresponding elements in
the shuffled sequence with probability better than guessing.
Preventing such a mapping also implies a need for changing
the ciphertexts without affecting the underlying plaintexts.
Besides privacy-preserving benchmarking, our protocol can
be applied to any scenario where n players send encrypted
inputs to a central service provider, e.g., a cloud service,
without it learning which player provided which input. This
includes use cases such as anonymous surveys, polls, and
voting. Before we present our shuffling protocol in Section IV,
we introduce required definitions and preliminaries and give
an overview of related work. In Sections V and VI, we prove
input privacy and correctness, respectively, before we evaluate
the complexity and performance of our protocol in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We restrict our considerations to asymmetric cryptosystems,
i.e., a tuple CS = (G,E,D) consisting of three polynomial-
time algorithms. The probabilistic key-generation algorithm G
takes as input a security parameter κ and outputs a key pair
(pk, sk) consisting of a public encryption key pk and a secret
decryption key sk. The probabilistic encryption algorithm E
takes as input a plaintext x ∈ M and pk and outputs the
ciphertext y = E(x, pk) ∈ C. M and C denote the plaintext
and ciphertext space, respectively. The decryption algorithm
D takes as input a ciphertext y ∈ C and sk and outputs
the plaintext x = D(y, sk) ∈ M. For simplification, we
denote the encryption of x ∈ Mi under a cryptosystem
CSi = (Gi, Ei, Di) for pki by y = Ei(x) and the decryption
of y ∈ Ci for ski by x = Di(y).
Homomorphic cryptosystems, such as RSA [31], Pail-
lier’s [28], and BGV [4], allow for computations on ci-
phertexts. A cryptosystem CS is homomorphic if applying
an operation ◦ to ciphertexts E(x1) and E(x2) yields the
ciphertext E(y) of the result y = x1 ∗ x2 of a corresponding
homomorphic operation ∗ applied to the plaintexts x1 and
x2 [22]. That is, E(x1) ◦ E(x2) = E(x1 ∗ x2). We restrict
our considerations to cryptosystems with an additive homo-
morphism enabling addition of the underlying plaintexts as
depicted in (1) and (2), such as Paillier’s cryptosystem [28].
D(E(x1) · E(x2)) = x1 + x2 (1)
D(E(x1)
x2) = x1 · x2 (2)
That is, multiplication of ciphertexts encrypted under the same
key pk yields an encryption of the sum of the underlying
plaintexts, encrypted under pk. This enables multiplication of
an encrypted value by a plaintext value via exponentiation.
Paillier’s cryptosystem allows for rerandomization [28].
Given pk and a ciphertext E(x) of a plaintext x, rerandom-
ization is an operation that computes a valid ciphertext E′(x)
without decryption. With high probability, E(x) 6= E′(x) is
ensured such that the output distributions of rerandomization
and encryption are computationally indistinguishable [14]. For
Paillier’s cryptosystem, it can be performed by multiplication
with the encrypted identity element 0 as depicted in (3) [28].
E(x) · E(0) = E(x+ 0) = E′(x) (3)
A hash function h(·) is a function that, for arbitrarily long
inputs x, computes outputs h(x) of fixed length [20]. It is
easy to compute h(x), called hash [21]. A hash function is
cryptographic if it provides pre-image resistance and collision-
resistance. The former guarantees that it is computationally
infeasible to compute x given only h(x) [21]. The latter
ensures that it is computationally infeasible to find two hashes
h(x) = h(x′) such that x 6= x′ [20].
We define a sequence S as an enumeration of elements si
that are arranged in a particular order. Multiple si can have the
same value. The number of si in S is referred to as its length.
We only use finite sequences of fixed length n and denote them
either by S = (s1, ..., sn) or by S = (..., si, ...) depending on
whether we want to emphasize the elements’ order or their
form. Given S = (s1, ..., sn), a random permutation π : S →
S′ is a permutation that is chosen uniformly at random from
the set of permutations on sequences of length n [20]. It yields
the permuted sequence S′ = (..., si, ...|si ∈ S) containing the
same n elements as S but in a randomly permuted order. We
denote the position of si in S′ permuted via π by π(si).
A function ϕ(m) is called negligible in m if for every
polynomial p(m) there is an m0 ∈ N such that for any
m > m0, ϕ(m) ≤
1
p(m) applies [20]. Let
{
X1m
}
m∈N
and
{
X2m
}
m∈N
be two sets of random variables. If for a
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A the advantage
ǫ =
∣∣Pr
[
A
(
X1m, 1
m
)
= 1
]
− Pr
[
A
(
X2m, 1
m
)
= 1
]∣∣ (4)
is negligible in m, the two sets are computationally indistin-
guishable [20].
In [18], a shuffle of a sequence of ciphertexts is defined
as a sequence of different ciphertexts of the same plaintexts,
arranged in a permuted order. We additionally require the
permutation to be secret and define a secret shuffle as follows.
Definition 1 (Secret Shuffle). Given a sequence of cipher-
texts X = (..., E(xi), ...) with 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A secret
shuffle S(·) is a function that, for input X , yields a se-
quence X = (..., E′(xpi(i)), ...) such that the ciphertexts
E′(x1) 6= E(x1), ..., E
′(xn) 6= E(xn) have the same plain-
texts x1, ..., xn. The order of the elements in X is randomly
permuted via a random permutation π. No participant can
learn more than negligibly much information about π.
III. RELATED WORK
A. Approaches with Additional (Neutral) Instances
In [6], Chaum introduces mix networks, a protocol that
enables anonymity and unlinkability of messages to their
senders at the cost of additional computational overhead. Mix
networks involve a sequence of servers, called mixes, which
receive a set of messages, shuffle, and forward them to the
next mix [18]. Unlinkability is guaranteed if at least one mix
is honest [18]. There are two kinds of shuffles: decryption and
re-encryption shuffles [1]. In decryption shuffles, the messages
are layered ciphertexts. Each mix removes one layer of encryp-
tion from each message and sorts the resulting plaintexts. In
re-encryption shuffles, the mixes rerandomize and permute the
messages via a randomly chosen permutation. A re-encryption
mix network that ensures simplified key management based
on universal re-encryption is given in [17]. In [32], the first
mix network that is universally composable and efficient
independent of the number of mixes is presented. The first
efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge proof for proving that
a mix shuffled correctly is proposed in [19]. A description of
how the permutation used by a mix can be constructed by
multiple parties is given in [10].
Unfortunately, mix networks cannot be used in the described
scenario to ensure unlinkability between players and their
inputs due to several drawbacks. Most importantly, mixes need
to be provided by different, independent parties [29]. This
cannot be guaranteed in scenarios with a single, central service
provider. The same applies to Riffle [24], an alternative to mix
networks.
B. Approaches Based on Trusted Hardware
Alternatively, unlinkability can be achieved by shuffling
in trusted hardware, e.g., Intel Software Guard Extensions
(SGX) [8]. Generating and applying the random permutation
as well as rerandomization can be done inside trusted hardware
on the service-provider side. Such an approach is described
in [13] for database access pattern obfuscation. In [11], an
approach with a trusted unit with limited private memory per-
forming shuffling of encrypted data is given. An architecture
for privacy-preserving online analysis of client data based on
trusted hardware is presented in [2]. In setups with a trusted
CPU but no trusted memory, oblivious RAM (ORAM) can
ensure that untrustworthy RAM does not leak confidential
information [16].
However, these approaches imply different trust assump-
tions and relations such as trust in the manufacturing of the
trusted hardware. Therefore, they are not suitable for our
scenario with distrusting participants.
C. Approaches Based on Secure Multi-party Computation
One approach to secure multi-party computation is secret
sharing. In [25], three shuffling MPC protocols are proposed
for the Sharemind secure computation platform, focusing on
low communication and round complexity. In Sharemind,
computation is done by three independent parties [3]. This
does not fit our scenario with a single, central service provider.
Another shuffling protocol based on secret sharing is presented
in [27]. However, it is designed for decentralized settings.
Secure multi-party computation can also be based on homo-
morphic encryption. In [5], such an MPC protocol for shuffling
data in a setting of multiple data providers and one data miner
is proposed. It emulates a mix network in the sense that each
data provider itself acts as a mix. Hence, it does not require
independent mix servers. With its quadratic computational and
linear round complexity, it does not scale well.
A protocol for shuffling based on secret sharing and ho-
momorphic encryption is proposed in [23]. It is used as a
subprotocol to anonymizes players’ inputs prior to decen-
tralized sorting and benchmarking. The ownership relation is
concealed in a multi-round protocol where mix networks are
used to ensure anonymity. Hence, it has drawbacks similar
to those of mix networks. A constant-round benchmarking
protocol for centralized scenarios based on homomorphic
encryption is presented in [21]. Instead of sorting the full list of
encrypted KPIs, it computes in a privacy-preserving fashion
for each input the number of inputs that are smaller, such
that no participant learns any KPI’s rank. Even though this
approach does not require shuffling to prevent leaking KPIs’
ranks, it comes at the cost of quadratic computational and
communication complexity, which implies poor scalability.
IV. SECRET SHUFFLING PROTOCOL
A. Adversary Model
We design our protocol to be secure against any semi-honest
adversary A [26] that corrupts either an arbitrary number of
players or the service provider. That is, we exclude collusion
between any player and the service provider, like the related
work. Our shuffling protocol ensures input privacy. Hence, A
does not learn anything about non-corrupted players’ secret
inputs. Most importantly, we ensure that no such A is able
to map non-corrupted players’ inputs to their equivalents in
the shuffled sequence generated by the shuffling protocol. In
summary, no adversary corrupting either any subset of the
players or the service provider can determine the ownership
relation between non-corrupted players or their secret inputs.
B. Prerequisites
In the description of our protocol SHUFFLE, we use the
indices 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n for players Pi and Pj , respectively, as
well as their inputs xi (xj), random values ri (rj), etc. We
denote concatenation by “||”.
We assume two instances CS1 and CS2 of the DamgÃ¥rd-
Jurik cryptosystem [9], like Paillier’s [28]. The public keys
pk1 and pk2 are known to the service provider PS and the
players Pi. The secret key sk1 is known only to the players
and could be generated and distributed via Diffie-Hellman key
exchange [12]. The secret key sk2 is only known to PS . We
require the plaintext space M2 of CS2 to be a subset of the
plaintext space M1 of CS1, i.e.,
M2 ⊆M1. (5)
This ensures that any message that can be encrypted with pk2
can also be encrypted with pk1.
We require two random permutations π1 and π2, a cryp-
tographic hash function h(·), and two functions sort(S) and
position(S, si). The permutations π1 and π2 are both chosen
TABLE I: Secret Shuffling Protocol with Step Labels and Computations
Step Computation
1.1 Pi → PS : E1(xi)
1.2 E1(r1i )
2.1 PS → Pi: R′1 = (...,E1(r
′
1i
) = E1(r1pi1(i)
), ...)
2.2 X′ = (..., E1(x′i + r2i) = E1(xpi2(i) + r2i) = E1(xpi2(i)) · E1(r2i ), ...)
2.3 R2 = (..., E2(r2i ), ...)
2.4 r1S
2.5 Pi: H = (..., hj = h(r′1j ||r1S ), ...)
2.6 ρi = position(H′ = sort(H), hi)
2.7 Pi → PS : E′1(x
′
ρi
+ r2ρi ) = E1(x
′
ρi
+ r2ρi + 0) = E1(x
′
ρi
+ r2ρi ) ·E1(0)
2.8 E2(r2ρi + r3i ) = E2(r2ρi ) ·E2(r3i )
2.9 E1(r3i )
2.10 PS : X = (..., E′1(x
′
ρi
) = E′1(x
′
ρi
+ r2ρi ) ·E1((−1) ·D2(E2(r2ρi + r3i))) · E1(r3i ), ...)
by and only known to PS . The hashes of h(·) are assumed to
be uniformly distributed among the domain dom(h(·)). Given
a sequence S = (s1, ..., sn), sort(S) outputs a sequence S′
that contains s1, ..., sn in ascending order, as in (6) and (7).
S′ = (..., si, ...|si ∈ S) (6)
S′ = (s′1 ≤ s
′
2 ≤ · · · ≤ s
′
n) (7)
The function position(S, si) outputs the position of si in S.
Moreover, we assume pairwise secure, i.e., secret and au-
thentic, channels between each player and the service provider,
for instance established via Transport Layer Security (TLS).
C. Protocol Specification
According to Definition 1, for a protocol to secretly shuffle a
sequence, it has to permute the order of the entries by a random
permutation π. Furthermore, it has to change the ciphertexts
of the secret inputs such that π cannot be reconstructed. To
achieve this, each player performs two main tasks: randomly
but uniquely selecting some player’s encrypted input and
rerandomizing (see Equation (3)) this input. The former is
based on a novel approach to random index distribution. For
this random index distribution, each player provides a random
input, which is concatenated with a random value given by the
service provider. The resulting concatenations are then hashed
and the hashes are sorted. The position of the hash in the
sorted list of hashes corresponding to a player’s random input
is its random index. Our protocol runs in two communication
rounds. The first round is used for collecting the players’
inputs and the second round conducts the actual shuffling. It
is depicted in Table I and explained in Section IV-D.
D. Protocol Explanation
In step 1.1, each player sends its private input xi that
is supposed to be shuffled, encrypted under CS1. Then, in
step 1.2, each player chooses a (presumably unique) random
value r1i ∈ M1 and sends it to PS , encrypted under CS1.
This random value will be used for random index distribution.
Hence, the service provider receives two list of n ciphertexts.
The service provider then, in step 2.1, sends the full
list R′1 of encrypted random values E1(r1i) to the players.
Permutation via π1 prevents the players from learning which
r1i was provided by which player. Similarly, in step 2.2, it
sends the full list of encrypted input values E1(xi), permuted
via π2. To prevent the players from learning the secret inputs,
each plaintext xpi2(i) is blinded by a value r2i ∈ M1, chosen
individually and at random for each i by the service provider.
The full list of random values r2i , encrypted under CS2, is
sent to the players in step 2.3. Then, PS chooses one long
random value r1S , e.g., r1S ∈M1, and sends it to the players
in step 2.4. Hence, the players receive the same three lists of
n ciphertexts and the same random value.
In step 2.5, each Pi decrypts the ciphertexts E1(r′1j ) ∈ R
′
1,
1 ≤ j ≤ n. If the values r′1j are not unique, the players
abort the protocol. Otherwise, each player concatenates each
resulting plaintext r′1j with the random value r1S of PS and
computes the n hashes hj . Using r1S as a seed of the hash
function prevents any player Pi from selecting a specific r1i
in step 1.2 to obtain a desired hash hi, which would eventually
affect the (random) index distribution. In step 2.6, each Pi sorts
the list of hashes. For the hash hi = h(ri||rPS ) corresponding
to player Pi’s random value r1i , the position ρi in the sorted
list of hashes is the random index of Pi. Hence, each player
computes an individual, random index ρi that is unknown to
PS and not related to the rank of its input xi.
Given ρi, each player sends the ciphertext E1(x′ρi+r2ρi ) to
PS in step 2.7. To prevent the service provider from learning
ρi, this ciphertext is rerandomized. Additionally, in step 2.8,
the encrypted random value of index ρi in R2, i.e., E2(r2i), is
sent to PS . The underlying plaintext r2i is blinded by a random
value r3i . This random value r3i , encrypted under CS1, is then
sent to PS in step 2.9. Hence, the service provider receives
three ciphertexts from each player.
In step 2.10, the service provider decrypts the ciphertexts
E2(r2ρi + r3i) received in step 2.8, multiplies the resulting
plaintexts with −1, and encrypts the products under cryptosys-
tem CS1. The resulting ciphertexts are multiplied with the
ciphertexts E1(x′ρi +r2ρi ) of step 2.7 and E1(r3i) of step 2.9.
Consequently, the random values r2i and r3i are eliminated,
resulting in rerandomized ciphertexts χi = E1(x′ρi).
The order of the rerandomized ciphertexts χi of the input
values xi is determined by the input order of the values in
steps 2.7 to 2.9 as received via network. Every Pi sends
some Pj’s rerandomized, encrypted input, chosen based on
its random index. The service provider cannot map between
the original input order and the order of X . Therefore, PS’s
output is a shuffled list. The players do not get an output.
V. PROOF OF INPUT PRIVACY
We denote privacy by a tuple (a, b), stating that a players
or (exclusively) b service providers can be corrupted without
input privacy being at risk. We prove that the players’ inputs in
the protocol SHUFFLE are (t, 1)-private against semi-honest
adversaries A. This is formalized as follows.
Theorem 1 (Input Privacy). The protocol SHUFFLE
(t, 1)-privately computes the shuffled sequence
X = (E′1(xpi(1)), ..., E
′
1(xpi(n))) from the input sequence
(x1, ..., xn) in the semi-honest model as long as there is no
collusion between any player and the service provider.
First, we define the view of a participant as follows [15].
Definition 2 (View). A participant Pi’s view Vi(x1, ..., xn) =
{xi, ri,mi1 , ...,miφ} in the execution of a protocol Π on
inputs (x1, ..., xn) contains Pi’s input xi, Pi’s internal ran-
dom tape ri, and any message mik that Pi receives during
execution of Π.
For a secure computation protocol to be secure in the
semi-honest model, it is sufficient to prove that anything an
adversaryA can learn during protocol execution can as well be
learned given only the inputs and outputs of the protocol [26].
That is, it is sufficient to show that the view of A can
be generated by some polynomial-time algorithm S, called
simulator, entirely based on the inputs and outputs of the t
corrupted players or the exclusively corrupted service provider.
This can be formalized as follows [15].
Definition 3 (Functionality, Simulator, Privacy). Let
f(x1, ..., xn) : ({0, 1}
∗)n ֌ ({0, 1}∗)n be the shuffling
functionality. For I = {i1, ..., it} ⊂ {1, ..., n} let
VI(x1, ..., xn) = (I, Vi1 (x1, ..., xn), ..., Vit(x1, ..., xn)).
The protocol SHUFFLE (t, 1)-privately computes
f(x1, ..., xn) if there exists a polynomial-time simulator
S that, given the corrupted participants’ inputs and
output, generates an output that is computationally
indistinguishable from VI(x1, ..., xn) for any I , i.e.,
S(I, (xi1 , ..., xit), f(x1, ..., xn))
c
≡ VI(x1, ..., xn).
a) Proof Outline: Our protocol has two different kinds
of participants: n players with an input but no output and
one service provider with no input but an output. Hence,
we have two different views that need to be simulated by
two different simulators. They simulate the protocol inputs by
taking the inputs from the real protocol execution and simulate
the coin tosses by using the same pseudo-random generator
(PRG) as in the real protocol execution. This results in a
simplified view that only contains the messages mik , which
the corrupted participants receive. We prove our protocol to
1-privately compute the shuffling functionality f in case an
adversary A corrupts only the service provider. Additionally,
we prove that the protocol SHUFFLE t-privately computes f
in case an adversary A corrupts t players but not the service
provider. This leads to the two Lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 1 (Input Privacy – Players). The protocol
SHUFFLE t-privately computes the shuffled sequence
X = (E′1(xpi(1)), ..., E
′
1(xpi(n))) from the input sequence
(x1, ..., xn) for semi-honest adversaries that corrupt t players
but not the service provider.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 1 gives the players’ view and
simulator. Then, the computational indistinguishability of the
view and the simulator’s output is shown.
Each player Pi provides as input a secret value xi and does
not get an output. The players have the secret decryption key
sk1 and can decrypt any ciphertext cj = E1(xj). An arrow
“→” shows the corresponding plaintexts that the players can
compute given sk1. Each Pi receives the following messages
in the respective protocol steps.
2.1 E1(r
′
11 ), ..., E1(r
′
1n)→ r
′
11 , ..., r
′
1n
2.2 E1(x
′
1+ r21), ..., E1(x
′
n+ r2n)→ x
′
1+ r21 , ..., x
′
n+ r2n
2.3 E2(r21 ), ..., E2(r2n)
2.4 r1S
If a message can be decrypted, the players’ simulator SPi
simulates the underlying plaintext. Encryption can be regarded
as a deterministic mapping of probability distributions [21].
Hence, if the computationally indistinguishable simulation of
a plaintext is possible, so is the computationally indistin-
guishable simulation of the corresponding ciphertext. Given
that dom(·) denotes the domain of a function, the players’
simulator SPi generates the following simulated messages.
2.1 n random values r2.11 , ..., r2.1n , uniformly chosen from
dom(D1(·)) =M1
2.2 n random values r2.21 , ..., r2.2n , uniformly chosen from
dom(D1(·)) =M1
2.3 n random values r2.31 , ..., r2.3n , uniformly chosen from
dom(E2(·)) = C2
2.4 A random value r2.4, uniformly chosen from
dom(D1(·)) =M1
We show that the simulator’s output and the players’ view
are computationally indistinguishable. To prove computational
indistinguishability of a real and a simulated message, one
needs to show that the probability distribution of the real
message is known to the simulator and that the function
generating the simulated output is identically distributed [21].
In step 2.1, the values sent are the random values that were uni-
formly chosen by the players in step 1.2 from dom(D1(·)) =
M1 and encrypted with pk1. The players can decrypt these
messages, resulting in the original random values. The values
generated by the simulator, which are chosen uniformly at
random from M1 = dom(D1(·)), are identically distributed.
In step 2.2, the values sent are sums of the players’ secret
inputs and random values that were uniformly chosen by the
service provider from M1 = dom(D1(·)) and encrypted with
pk1. The players can decrypt these messages, resulting in the
original sums with one summand being a uniformly chosen
random number. Hence, they are identically distributed to
the simulator’s output, which are values chosen uniformly at
random from M1 = dom(D1(·)).
The message of step 2.3 cannot be decrypted by Pi.
The DamgÃ¥rdâC“Jurik cryptosystem ensures semantic secu-
rity [9]. Hence, ciphertexts are computationally indistinguish-
able from values that are chosen uniformly at random from
the ciphertext space. The real messages in dom(E2(·)) = C2
are computationally indistinguishable from the simulator’s
outputs, chosen uniformly at random from dom(E2(·)) = C2.
In step 2.4, the real message is a value that was chosen uni-
formly at random from dom(D1(·)) = M1. The simulator’s
output, chosen uniformly at random from dom(D1(·)) =M1,
and the real message are identically distributed.
Given these comparisons, the described simulator for the
players generates an output that is computationally indistin-
guishable from real views.
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 (Input Privacy – Service Provider). The proto-
col SHUFFLE 1-privately computes the shuffled sequence
X = (E′1(xpi(1)), ..., E
′
1(xpi(n))) from the input sequence
(x1, ..., xn) for semi-honest adversaries that corrupt the ser-
vice provider.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 2 gives the service provider’s
view and simulator. Then, the computational indistinguisha-
bility of the view and the simulator’s output is shown.
The service provider PS does not have an input. Its output
are the permuted, rerandomized encryptions of the players’
inputs. It knows the secret decryption key sk2 and can decrypt
any cj = E2(xj). An arrow “→” shows the plaintexts that it
can compute given sk2. It receives the following messages.
1.1 E1(xi)
1.2 E1(r1i)
2.7 E′1(x
′
ρi
+ r2ρi )
2.8 E2(r2ρi + r3i)→ r2ρi + r3i
2.9 E1(r3i)
If a message can be decrypted, the service provider’s
simulator SPS simulates the underlying plaintext. It generates
the following simulated messages.
1.1 A random value r1.1, uniformly chosen from
dom(E1(·)) = C1
1.2 A random value r1.2, uniformly chosen from
dom(E1(·)) = C1
2.7 A random value r2.7, uniformly chosen from
dom(E1(·)) = C1
2.8 A random value r2.8, uniformly chosen from
dom(D2(·)) =M2
2.9 A random value r2.9, uniformly chosen from
dom(E1(·)) = C1
We show that the simulator’s output and the service
provider’s views are computationally indistinguishable.
The messages of steps 1.1, 1.2, 2.7, and 2.9 are ciphertexts
in dom(E1(·)) = C1, which cannot be decrypted by PS .
Based on the semantic security of the DamgÃ¥rdâC“Jurik
cryptosystem, the real messages are computationally indis-
tinguishable from the simulator’s output, which are random
values uniformly chosen from dom(E1(·)) = C1.
In step 2.8, the value sent is the sum of a player’s secret
input and a random value that was chosen by Pi uniformly
fromM2 = dom(D2(·)) and encrypted with pk2. The service
provider can decrypt this message, resulting in the original sum
with one summand being a uniformly chosen random num-
ber. Therefore, it is identically distributed to the simulator’s
output, which is a value chosen uniformly at random from
M2 = dom(D2(·)).
Given these comparisons, the described simulator for the
service provider generates an output that is computationally
indistinguishable from real views.
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
VI. PROOF OF CORRECTNESS
Correctness of our protocol is shown by proving Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 (Correctness). The protocol SHUFFLE conducts
a secret shuffle of the n players’ encrypted inputs. That is,
for every sequence of ciphertexts X = (..., E1(xi), ...) with
1 ≤ i ≤ n, the protocol SHUFFLE yields as output a sequence
X = (..., E′1(xpi(i)), ...) such that the ciphertexts E
′
1(xi) 6=
E1(xi) have the same plaintexts xi, but their order in X is
randomly permuted by a permutation π. The permutation π is
not known to any participant as long as there is no collusion
between any player and the service provider.
To improve readability of the proof of correctness, we
split Theorem 2 into the three Lemmas according to the
properties of a secret shuffle as given in Definition 1, which
we will prove separately. First, we will prove that the protocol
SHUFFLE outputs a randomly permuted sequence (Lemma 3).
Then, we show that the ciphertexts in the output sequence
are different from those of the input sequence but encrypt
the same plaintexts (Lemma 4). We complete the proof of
correctness by proving that no participant learns the overall,
random permutation (Lemma 7).
A. Randomly Permuted Ciphertexts
Lemma 3 (Randomly Permuted Ciphertexts). The ciphertexts
in sequence X = (..., E′1(xpi(i)), ...) output by the protocol
SHUFFLE are permuted compared to the ciphertexts in the
input sequence X = (..., E1(xi), ...) with a random permuta-
tion π.
We prove Lemma 3 by showing that the encrypted inputs
sent in step 2.7 are selected based on unique, random indices.
Proof. The order of sequence X = (..., E1(xi), ...) is de-
termined by the order in which the service provider PS
receives these inputs (step 1.1). The order of sequence X ′ =
(..., E1(xpi2(i)+r2i), ...) is determined by the random permuta-
tion π2 (step 2.2). The order of sequence R = (..., E1(r1i ), ...)
is determined by the order in which the service provider PS
receives these inputs (step 1.2). The order of sequence R′ =
(..., E1(r1pi1(i)), ...) is determined by the random permutation
π1 (step 2.1).
The values r1i and rPS (step 2.4) are chosen uniformly at
random and known to each player. Starting from step 2.5, the
random values r1i are guaranteed to be distinct. Therefore,
and as h(·) is a cryptographic hash function, ensuring collision
resistance (see Section IV-B), it follows that the n hashes
hi = h(r1i ||r1S )
= h(D1(E1(r1i))||r1S )
(8)
in the sequence H = (..., hi, ...) are distinct, except with
negligible probability. Since the hashes of h(·) are required
to be uniformly distributed among the domain dom(h(·))
(see Section IV-B), the values in H are uniformly distributed
among dom(h(·)) too. Since every player Pi knows its random
value r1i of step 1.2 and r1S , each Pi also knows its unique
corresponding hash hi ∈ H .
The function sort(·) sorts a sequence in ascending order.
Hence, the sequence H ′ = sort(H), computed in step 2.6
contains the same values as the sequence H but sorted in
ascending order. Therefore, each player Pi knows the position
of its hash in the sorted list of hashes H ′. This position
is extracted with the function position(H ′, hi), which thus
provides the correct index ρi of Pi’s hash hi in H ′.
Assume ρi can be distinguished from a random element
in {1, ..., n}. This implies that the permutation applied by
the function sort(·) can be distinguished from a random
permutation. Sorting a sequence of distinct random values
produces a random permutation over the random input val-
ues [7]. According to the above assumption, if the result of
sort(·) is distinguishable from a random permutation, then
the result of h(·) is distinguishable from random values as
well. However, as a cryptographically secure hash function is
a random oracle, this contradicts the assumption of a random
oracle. According to this contradiction, the random indices
ρi are computationally indistinguishable from values chosen
uniformly at random from {1, ..., n}. Since the hashes in H ,
and therefore also the hashes in H ′, are distinct, the n values
ρi ∈ {1, ..., n} are also distinct.
Consequently, the ciphertextE1(x′ρi+r2i) selected fromX
′ by
player Pi in step 2.7 based on ρi is randomly and exclusively
selected.
The order of sequence X = (..., E′1(x
′
ρi
), ...) (step 2.10) is
determined by the order in which the service provider receives
the ciphertexts of steps 2.7 to 2.9 from the players. The
ciphertext sent by Pi encrypts some Pj’s secret input chosen
from a randomly permuted sequence based on its uniformly
distributed, unique index ρi. Hence, the order of encrypted
inputs in X is randomly permuted.
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
B. Distinct Ciphertexts
Lemma 4 (Distinct Ciphertexts). The ciphertexts in sequence
X = (..., E′1(xpi(i)), ...) output by the protocol SHUFFLE
encrypt the same plaintexts xi as the ciphertexts in the input
sequence X = (..., E1(xi), ...). The ciphertexts E
′
1(xi) ∈ X
and E1(xi) ∈ X encrypting the same plaintext xi are distinct,
i.e., E′1(x1) 6= E1(x1), ..., E
′
1(xn) 6= E1(xn), and cannot be
mapped to each other by the service provider.
We prove Lemma 4 by showing that the operations per-
formed on the uniquely and randomly selected ciphertexts
change the ciphertexts without affecting their plaintexts.
Proof. In step 2.2, sequence X = (..., E1(xi), ...) of the input
ciphertexts is randomly permuted with a permutation π2 and
the underlying plaintexts are blinded with a random value r2i ,
resulting in the sequence
X ′ =
(
..., E1
(
xpi2(i)
)
· E1 (r2i) , ...
)
=
(
..., E1
(
xpi2(i) + r2i
)
, ...
)
= (..., E1 (x
′
i + r2i) , ...) .
(9)
Permutations only affect the order of a sequence’s elements but
not the elements themselves (see Section II). Hence, sequence
X ′ contains encryptions of the original n plaintexts xi, blinded
with n random values r2i .
In step 2.7, for each player Pi with individual index ρi (see
Proof of Lemma 3), the ciphertext E1(x′i + r2i) ∈ X
′ is
rerandomized by multiplication with E1(0). The result is the
different ciphertext E′1(x
′
ρi
+ r2ρi ) 6= E1 (x
′
i + r2i) of the
same plaintext (see (10)).
E′1
(
x′ρi + r2ρi
)
= E1
(
x′ρi + r2ρi
)
·E1 (0)
= E1
(
x′ρi + r2ρi + 0
) (10)
As the service provider knows the secret decryption key sk2, in
step 2.10, it can decrypt the ciphertext E2(r2ρi+r3i), negate it
via multiplication by −1, and encrypt it with pk1. Multiplying
the resulting ciphertext E1(−r2ρi−r3i) with the ciphertexts of
steps 2.7 and 2.9 yields the rerandomized, unblinded ciphertext
E′1(x
′
ρi
) of an input value x′ρi as follows.
E′1
(
x′ρi
)
= E′1
(
x′ρi + r2ρi + 0
)
· E1 ((−1) ·D2 (E2 (r2ρi + r3i)))
· E1 (r3i)
= E′1
(
x′ρi + r2ρi + 0
)
· E1 ((−1) · (r2ρi + r3i)) · E1 (r3i)
= E′1
(
x′ρi + r2ρi + 0
)
· E1 (−r2ρi − r3i) · E1 (r3i)
= E′1
(
x′ρi + r2ρi + 0− r2ρi − r3i + r3i
)
= E′1
(
x′ρi + 0
)
(11)
These rerandomized ciphertexts E′1(x
′
ρi
) form sequence X =
(..., E′1(x
′
ρi
), ...). From (9), (10), and (11), it follows that
these ciphertexts encrypt the same plaintexts as the ciphertexts
E1(x
′
ρi
) ∈ X ′ and therefore also the same plaintexts as the
ciphertexts E1(xi) ∈ X .
From (10), it follows that the rerandomized ciphertexts
E′1(xi) ∈ X and the non-rerandomized ciphertexts E1(xi) ∈
X that encrypt the same secret input xi are different from each
other, i.e., E′1(x1) 6= E1(x1), ..., E
′
1(xn) 6= E1(xn). As the
service provider does not learn the probabilistic encryptions
E1(0) used in step 2.7 for rerandomization, it cannot invert
the rerandomization of the ciphertexts E1(x′ρi + r2ρi ). Con-
sequently, the service provider cannot map the rerandomized
ciphertexts in X to the original ciphertexts in X .
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.
C. Secret Permutation
The overall permutation π applied during the protocol
SHUFFLE consists of the following two composed, indepen-
dent permutations.
• The permutation π2, applied by the service provider in
step 2.2 to permute X ′.
• The permutation which the players implicitly apply to the
output sequence X by selecting a ciphertext E1(x′ρi +
r2ρi ) based on their random indices. We denote it by π3.
That leads to the overall permutation π(i) = π3(π2(i)). As
there are two different kinds of participants, we prove secrecy
of π separately for the players (Lemma 5) and for the service
provider (Lemma 6).
Lemma 5 (Secret Permutation – Players). The
protocol SHUFFLE computes the shuffled sequence
X = (..., E′1(xpi(i)), ...) from the input sequence
X = (..., E1(xi), ...) based on a random permutation
π such that no player learns the permutation π as long as
there is no collusion between any player and the service
provider.
Proof. Permutation π2 is chosen at random by the service
provider in step 2.2. Collusion between players and the service
provider is excluded. Hence, π2 cannot be reconstructed by
the players from the sequence X ′ as they cannot recover their
blinded secret inputs from the ciphertexts E1(xpi2(i)+r2i) (see
Proof of Lemma 1). Therefore, the players cannot learn the
permutation π2, except with negligible probability.
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.
Lemma 6 (Secret Permutation – Service Provider).
The protocol SHUFFLE computes the shuffled sequence
X = (..., E′1(xpi(i)), ...) from the input sequence X =
(..., E1(xi), ...) based on a random permutation π such that
the service provider cannot learn the permutation π as long
as there is no collusion between any player and the service
provider.
Proof. The ciphertext sent by Pi in step 2.7 is rerandomized
(see Proof of Lemma 4) and encrypts some player Pρi ’s secret
input. It is chosen based on Pi’s uniformly distributed, unique
index ρi. Therefore, the order of the encrypted (rerandomized)
inputs in X computed in step 2.10 is randomly permuted
by the permutation π3. The service provider cannot map the
rerandomized ciphertexts of step 2.7 to those of sequence
X ′ with probability better than guessing as it does not learn
the probabilistic encryptions of 0, E1(0), and as the corre-
sponding distributions are computationally indistinguishable
(see Section II). Therefore, an inversion of this permutation is
only possible given the players’ indices ρi, which are chosen
uniformly at random (see Proof of Lemma 3). The service
provider cannot decrypt the ciphertexts E1(r1i) of step 1.2
(see Proof of Lemma 2) and collusion between players and the
service provider is excluded. Hence PS cannot compute the
players’ hashes of step 2.5 and it cannot compute the players’
random indices. Therefore, the order of the ciphertexts in X
is randomly permuted by π3, which can only be reconstructed
by PS with negligible probability.
This completes the proof of Lemma 6.
As the final step of our proof of secrecy of the permutation
π, we show that the proofs of Lemmas 5 and 6 are sufficient
to prove that no participant can learn the overall permutation
π as long as there is no collusion between any player and the
service provider, formalized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 7 (Secret Permutation). The protocol SHUFFLE
computes the shuffled sequence X = (..., E′1(xpi(i)), ...) from
the input sequence X = (..., E1(xi), ...) based on a random
permutation π. The permutation π is not known to any
participant as long as there is no collusion between any player
and the service provider.
Proof. To compute the composed permutation π, one needs
to know both π2 and π3. As both independent permutations
π2 and π3 are random, so is their composition π. To show
that no participant can learn π, it is sufficient to show that no
single participant can learn both π2 and π3. That is, for the
composite permutation π to be private, at least one of the two
permutations π2 or π3 needs to be private for each participant.
The proof of Lemma 5 proves that none of the n players can
learn π as long as there is no collusion between any player and
the service provider. The proof of Lemma 6 proves that the
service provider cannot learn π as long as there is no collusion
between any player and the service provider.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 7.
D. Summary
As the final step of our proof of correctness, we show that
the proofs of Lemmas 3, 4, and 7 are sufficient to prove
Theorem 2, i.e., Lemmas 3, 4, and 7 imply Theorem 2.
Proof. From the proof of Lemma 3, it follows that the
ciphertexts in sequence X = (..., E′1(xpi(i)), ...) encrypting
the plaintexts xi are permuted compared to the ciphertexts
in sequence X = (..., E1(xi), ...) with a random permutation
π. According to the proof of Lemma 7, the permutation π is
not known to any participant as long as there is no collusion
between any player and the service provider. From the proof
of Lemma 4, it follows that the ciphertexts in sequence X =
(..., E′1(xpi(i)), ...) output by the protocol SHUFFLE encrypt
TABLE II: Service Provider’s Computational and Communi-
cation Complexity of the Protocol
Step Enc Dec Mult Message length
2.1 n · n · lC1
2.2 n n n · n · lC1
2.3 n n · n · lC2
2.4 n · lM1
2.10 n n 2 · n
Total 3 · n n 3 · n 2 · n2 · lC1 + n
2 · lC2 + n · lM1
the same plaintexts xi as the ciphertexts in the input sequence
X = (..., E1(xi), ...). It also proves that the ciphertexts
E′1(xi) = X and E1(xi) ∈ X encrypting the same plaintext xi
are distinct, i.e., E′1(x1) 6= E1(x1), ..., E
′
1(xn) 6= E1(xn). The
combination of these proofs shows that the protocol SHUFFLE
performs a secret shuffle of the n players’ encrypted inputs.
For every sequence of ciphertexts X = (..., E1(xi), ...) with
1 ≤ i ≤ n, the protocol SHUFFLE yields as output a
sequence X = (..., E′1(xpi(i)), ...) such that the ciphertexts
E′1(xi) 6= E1(xi) have the same plaintexts xi. Their order in
X is randomly permuted by a permutation π. This permutation
is not known to any participant as long as there is no collusion
between any player and the service provider.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The performance evaluation of our protocol SHUFFLE is
twofold: We first investigate its asymptotic computational,
communication, and round complexity in a theoretical analy-
sis. Then, we examine its performance in an empirical analysis
and compare it to the performance of mix networks.
A. Asymptotic Complexity
1) Round Complexity: As depicted in Table I, the protocol
consists of two rounds and a total of twelve protocol steps.
Both values are independent of the number of players n.
Therefore, the round complexity is constant in n, i.e., O(1).
2) Computational Complexity: We investigate the number
of operations that need to be carried out by the service provider
and each player, respectively. We restrict our considerations
to the cryptographic operations encryption, decryption, and
ciphertext multiplication as they can be assumed to be the most
complex ones. Their numbers are given in the middle columns
of Tables II and III. The resulting asymptotic computational
complexity is O(n), i.e., linear in the number of players n,
for both the service provider and each player.
3) Communication Complexity: To determine the commu-
nication complexity of the protocol, we investigate the length
of the messages sent in each step of the protocol by the service
provider and each player, respectively. These are given in the
rightmost columns of Tables II and III. Here, lMi and lCi
denote the maximum length of plaintexts in Mi and cipher-
texts in Ci, respectively. The total asymptotic communication
complexity of each player is O(n), i.e., linear in the number of
TABLE III: Each Player’s Computational and Communication
Complexity of the Protocol
Step Enc Dec Mult Message length
1.1 1 lC1
1.2 1 lC1
2.5 n
2.6
2.7 1 1 lC1
2.8 1 1 lC2
2.9 1 lC1
Total 5 n 2 4 · lC1 + lC2
players n. The service provider’s communication complexity
is O(n2), i.e., quadratic in the number of players n. Compared
to related work, such as [6], our protocol has higher asymptotic
communication complexity. However, we accept this loss as it
helps reduce the computational complexity asymptotically.
B. Empirical Performance
To investigate the practical performance of the protocol,
we implemented both the players’ and the service provider’s
part of the protocol and deployed them in a cloud-computing
setting. The service provider was implemented as a Java
HttpServlet and deployed in a cloud-computing instance with
96 CPUs and 384 GB RAM. To emulate sufficiently large
numbers of independent players, we implemented the players’
protocol steps in a Java HttpServlet and deployed the players in
a Kubernetes cluster based on a cloud-computing instance with
96 CPUs and 384 GB RAM. We instantiated one Kubernetes
node per player and provided each node with one CPU and
4 GB RAM, which compares to the minimum requirements
on a standard desktop computer. Therefore, we were able to
emulate up to 96 players. Service provider and players were
deployed in different data centers in two major European cities
with a distance of approximately 650 kilometers to ensure
a lifelike communication scenario. We used the additively
homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem for CS1 and CS2.
For comparison, we implemented a simple yet efficient re-
encryption mix network. Its construction is similar to the one
described in [17], but instead of the ElGamal cryptosystem
with universal re-encryption, we used the standard version
of Paillier’s cryptosystem. Re-encryption (rerandomization) is
performed given the public key of the players, which is a
valid approach as the senders, i.e., players, in the shuffling
scenario share the same key and the recipient, i.e., service
provider, is not supposed to decrypt the received confidential
data. We implemented the mixes as Java HttpServlets and
deployed them in a similar cloud-computing setting as above,
running each mix on an instance with 96 CPUs and 384
GB RAM. In a cascade of mixes, each mix receives all the
messages at the same time in one batch, permutes and re-
encrypts them, and forwards the full batch to the next mix
or the recipient. This matches the communication setting of
the service provider having the mix network shuffle all the
messages once it received the full list from the players.
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Fig. 2: Results of the Empirical Performance Analysis
Fig. 2a depicts the execution time t relatively to the number
of messages n for 1024-bit keys for our shuffling protocol
and for mix networks with cascades of three and five mixes,
respectively. Shuffling 96 inputs with out shuffling protocol
took 2.08 seconds while the mix networks performed shuffling
in 0.51 and 0.80 seconds, respectively. For 2048-bit keys,
shuffling 96 inputs took 9.69 seconds with our protocol and
2.71 and 4.53 seconds with mix networks (see Fig. 2b). For
both key lengths, the execution time of our shuffling protocol
grows linearly in the number of players. Most importantly,
the empirical results show that a mix network of five mixes
with appropriate key length is only 2.14 times faster than our
shuffling protocol. However, recall that to achieve this perfor-
mance, mix networks require multiple independent servers to
perform the mixing whereas our shuffling protocol requires
only a single server. Given the linear nature of re-encryption
mix networks, one can reasonably assume that our protocol
performs similar to a mix network of ten to eleven mixes.
Furthermore, the linear growth of the execution time of
our shuffling protocol indicates that the overall effect of the
communication complexity being quadratic in n is minor. To
further support this assumption, we investigated the ratio of
computation time to communication time (see Fig. 2c). For
growing n, the ratio of our protocol shows logarithmic trend.
Besides that, its computation percentage is only a fraction
of the computation percentage of the mix networks, which
implies a smaller demand for computing power.
C. Summary
Our protocol has constant round complexity and linear
computational complexity. Our empirical performance analysis
shows that the execution time is linear in n. This implies that
the fact that the communication complexity of our shuffling
protocol is quadratic in n, only has a minor impact on the
overall execution time. In this analysis, shuffling 96 secret
inputs encrypted under a 2048 bits long Paillier key took
9.69 seconds, which proves the practicability of our secret
shuffling protocol. Performing shuffling via a mix network
of five mixes takes roughly half as long. However, such
a mix network requires five independent, powerful servers,
each of which performs O(n) cryptographic operations and
therefore consumes an amount of energy that is linear in n.
Furthermore, the much smaller percentage of time required
for computation relatively to communication in our shuffling
protocol indicates generally lower cloud-computing costs and
lower energy consumption. Therefore, we consider our secret
shuffling protocol as a valuable alternative to mix networks.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We present an efficient secure multi-party protocol for
shuffling encrypted data. It precludes any mapping between
ciphertexts in the unshuffled and the shuffled sequence with
probability better than guessing. We prove correctness of
our shuffling functionality and privacy of the confidential
inputs. Key element of our contribution is a novel approach
to efficient random index distribution, which provides the
random, secret permutation. The shuffling protocol has com-
putational complexity linear in the number of players as
well as constant round complexity. It shuffles 96 ciphertexts
in 9.69 seconds for 2048 bit long keys. We show that the
effect of the communication complexity on the execution
time is minor, which ensures good scalability. Our shuffling
protocol performs asymptotically better than previous MPC-
based shuffling approaches that focus on low communication
complexity but suffer from higher computational complexity,
which has negative impact on scalability. Furthermore, its
execution time is only 2.14 times that of a mix network of five
mixes but requires no additional, independent servers. This
not only enables use cases with centralized communication
scenarios, but also causes much lower cloud-computing costs.
Being a general-purpose protocol, it can be used in a vari-
ety of applications such as privacy-preserving benchmarking
systems, anonymous surveys, polls, voting, and many more.
IX. FUTURE WORK
The protocol’s applicability could be further improved by
reducing its communication complexity. This can be achieved
with a more efficient approach to obtaining the input cipher-
texts from the service provider and selecting one of unique,
random index. Moreover, it could be modified to be secure
against malicious adversaries [26]. In a more generic version,
m encrypted inputs could be present on the service-provider
side prior to the protocol execution instead of being provided
by the n players. The n players could then shuffle the m
values. Further security analysis is necessary to investigate
the implications of setting n ≪ m where players generate
multiple random indices and select and rerandomize multiple
ciphertexts at once. This would further decrease the commu-
nication complexity and improve scalability of the protocol.
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